Many online social network (OSN) users are unaware of the numerous security risks that exist in these networks, including privacy violations, identity theft, and sexual harassment, just to mention a few. According to recent studies, many online social network users readily expose personal and private details about themselves, such as relationship status, date of birth, school name, email address, phone number, and even home address. This information, if fallen into the wrong hands, can be used to harm users, both in the virtual and in the real world. These risks become even more severe when the users are children. In this paper we present a thorough review of the different security and privacy risks which threaten the well-being of OSN users in general, and children in particular. In addition, we present an overview of existing solutions that can provide better protection, security, and privacy for OSN users. Moreover, we offer simple-toimplement recommendations for OSN users which can assist them in improving their security and privacy when using these platforms. We conclude this paper by suggesting future research directions.
Introduction
In recent years, global online social network (OSN) usage has increased sharply as these networks become interwoven into people's everyday lives as places to meet and communicate with others. Online social networks, such as Facebook [31] , Google+ [49] , LinkedIn [64] , Sina Weibo [117] , Twitter [110] , Tumblr [109] , and VKontakte (VK) [112] , have hundreds of millions of daily active users (see Figure 1) . Facebook, for example, has more than 1.15 billion monthly active users, 819 million of which are active mobile Facebook users as of June 2013 [37] . Figure 1 : Word Cloud of Online Social Networks with More Than 100 Million Active Users. This word cloud was constructed using Wordle [38] where the font size of each OSN name is relative to the network's number of active users [118] .
Facebook users have on average 138 friends and create around 90 pieces of content each month. Unfortunately, many OSN users are unaware of the security risks which exist in these types of communications, including privacy risks [15, 80] , identity theft [14] , malware [10] , fake profiles (also in some cases referred to as sybils [18, 103] or socialbots [15, 16, 29] ), and sexual harassment [119, 124] , among others. According to recent studies [2, 15] , many OSN users expose personal and intimate details about themselves, their friends, and their personal relationships, whether by posting photos or by directly providing information such as a home address and a phone number. Moreover, according to Boshmaf et al. [15] and Elishar et al. [29, 30] , Facebook users have been shown to accept friendship requests from people whom they do not know but who simply have several friends in common. By accepting these friend requests, users unknowingly disclose their private information to total strangers. This information could be used maliciously, harming users both in the virtual and in the real world. These risks escalate when the users are children or teenagers who are by nature more exposed and vulnerable than adults.
As the use of online social networks becomes progressively more embedded into the everyday lives of users, personal information becomes easily exposed and abused. Information harvesting, by both the online social network operator itself and by third-party commercial companies, has recently been identified as a significant security concern for OSN users. Companies can use the harvested personal information for a variety of purposes, all of which can jeopardize a user's privacy. For example, companies can use collected private information to tailor online ads according to a user's profile [107] , to gain profitable insights about their customers, or even to share the user's private and personal data with the government [78] . This information may include general data, such as age, gender, and income; however, in some cases more personal information can be exposed, such as the user's sexual orientation [58] and even if the user consumed addictive substances [60] . These privacy issues become more alarming when considering the nature of online social networks: information can be obtained on a network user without even directly accessing that individual's online profile; personal details can be inferred solely by collecting data on the user's friends [80] .
To cope with the above-mentioned threats, multiple solutions have been offered by OSN operators, security companies, and academic researchers. Online social network operators, like Facebook, attempt to protect their users by adding authentication processes to ensure that the registered user is a real person [15, 57, 100, 24, 86] . Moreover, many OSN operators also support a configurable user privacy setting that enables users to protect their personal data from other users within the network [66, 74] . As for privacy settings, online social network operators currently face a conflict of interest: On the one hand, as personal information is a commodity, the more that is shared, the better. On the other hand, a user who is anxious about privacy is a liability and will probably share less information and become less active. Nevertheless, regulating authorities and public groups both try to keep privacy concerns a part of public discourse and consideration [7] . Today there are additional protection mechanisms which include defenses against spammers [12, 27, 113, 102, 61, 3, 13] , fake profiles [127, 126, 26, 106, 18, 115, 42, 40, 41, 114] , and other threats. For example, security companies like Check Point [92] , Websense [116] , and United Parents [111] offer social tools to protect users in the OSN world. These companies typically offer products which monitor user activity in order to identify and protect users. The modern day threats are so pervasive that even the academic community has addressed this issue by publishing studies which attempt to solve different OSN threats and offer improvements in identity protection [27, 113, 40, 42, 61, 59] .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce insightful statistics on online social networks usage. Next, in Section 3, we describe different types of OSN threats. Section 4 follows with various solutions to assist in protecting OSN users. In Section 5, we offer recommendations that are easy for OSN users to apply in order to improve their security and privacy. Next, in Section 6, we present our conclusions. Lastly, in Section 7, we offer future research directions.
Online Social Network Usage
Today, many online social networks have tens of millions registered users. Facebook, with more than billion active users, is currently the biggest and most popular OSN in the world [36] . Other well-known OSNs are Google+, with over 235 million active users [52] ; Twitter, with over 200 million active users [39] ; and LinkedIn, with more than 160 million active users [65] . While some experts insist that online social networks are a passing fashion and will eventually be replaced by another Internet fad, current user statistics concur that OSNs are here to stay. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center's Internet and American Life Project [17] revealed that 72% of online American adults use social networking sites, a dramatic increase from the 2005 Pew survey which discovered that just 8% of online American adults used social networking sites. Moreover, the survey revealed that 89% of online American adults between the ages of 18 to 29 use social network sites, while in 2005 only 9% of the survey participants in this age group used this type of site. These survey results are compatible with a previous report published by Nielsen in 2011 [85] , disclosing that Americans spent 22.5% of their online time on OSNs and blogs, more than twice the time spent on online games (9.8%). Other common online activities that consume Americans' time include email (7.6%); portals (4.5%); videos and movies (4.4%); and searches and instant messaging at 4% and 3.3%, respectively. The amount of collective time spent on OSNs, especially on Facebook, is enormous and ever-growing. U.S. users spent a total of 53.5 billion minutes on Facebook during May 2011, 17.2 billion minutes on Yahoo [123], and 12.5 billion minutes on Google [50] .
Mobile devices, or cellular phones, also serve as platforms for Internet usage statistics. The Nielsen report suggested that almost two out of five OSN users access online social networks from mobile devices. Social applications are the third most-used type of application by smartphone users who download applications. It should be noted that the use of OSNs on mobile devices not only allows for an even "closer relation" to social networks but also can pose additional privacy concerns, especially around the issues of collecting location data and providing opportunities for advertisers to identify specific types of users.
Besides being popular among adults, online social networks have hugely attracted children and teenagers. A comprehensive 2010 study [68] , carried out in 25 European countries with 25,000 participants, produced the following statistics: 60% of children 9-16 years old who access the Internet use it daily (88 minutes of use on average) and 59% of 9-16 year olds who use the Internet have a personal OSN site profile (26% of 9-10 year olds; 49% of 11-12 year olds; 73% of 13-14 year olds; 82% of 15-16 year olds). Note that the terms of use governing OSNs do not officially allow users under the age of 13. Furthermore, 26% of the children in the European study had their social network profile set to "public" (e.g., accessible to strangers), 14% reported having their address or phone number listed on their profile, and 16% admitted that their profile displayed an inaccurate age. Details of the study revealed that 30% of the children surveyed reported having an online connection with a person they had never met face to face, 9% reported having actually met face to face with someone with whom they had only an online connection, 9% reported experiencing a misuse of personal data, 21% reported encountering one or more types of potentially harmful user-generated content, and 6% reported receiving malicious or hurtful messages on the Internet. These findings reiterate our previous claim: the use of online social networks is embedded in the everyday lives of children and teenagers, and can result in personal information being exposed, misused, and potentially abused. Interestingly, about a third of the parents in this European study claimed that they filter their children's use of the Internet, while a quarter specifically stated that they use monitoring tools.
Threats
With the increasing usage of online social networks, many users have unknowingly become exposed to various threats, both on their privacy and on their security. These threats can be divided into two main categories (see Figure 2 ). The first category relates to classic privacy and security threats, namely, threats that not only jeopardize OSN users but Internet users not using social networks as well (see Section 3.1). The second category concerns modern OSN threats, namely, threats that are mostly unique to the environment of online social networks and which use the OSN infrastructure to endanger user privacy and security (see Section 3.2). Further complicating the situation is the fact that today's attackers can, and often do, combine these two types of attacks in order to create a more sophisticated and lethal attack. In this section, we present in detail each of these types of threats. Furthermore, we appropriate a special focus on the urgent issues of misplaced trust of online "friends" and the resulting underlying threats to children who use these types of networks (see Section 3.3).
Classic Threats
Classic threats have been a problem ever since the Internet gained widespread usage. Often referred to as malware, cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks, or even phishing (among others), they continue to be an ongoing issue. Though these issues have been addressed in the past, they have recently become viral due to the structure and nature of online social networks and have begun to spread more quickly among network users. Classic threats can take advantage of a user's personal information published in a social network to attack not only the user but also their friends simply by adjusting the threat to accommodate the user's personal information. For example, an attacker can plant a malicious code inside an attractive spam message that employs a user's details from his or her Facebook profile. Due to the personal nature of this crafted message, the chances that the innocent user will open the message and get infected are likely. In many cases, these threats target essential and everyday user resources, such as credit card numbers, account passwords, computing power, and even computer bandwidth (in order to send spam emails).
The different classic threats are illustrated below, along with real-life scenarios, where these types of menaces have jeopardized a real user's privacy and security.
Malware. Malware is malicious software developed to disrupt a computer operation in order to collect a user's credentials and gain access to his or her private information. Malware in online social networks uses the OSN structure to spread itself between users and their friends in the network. For example, Koobface was the first malware to successfully propagate through OSNs. This malware succeeded in attacking users in many different online social networks, such as Facebook, MySpace [83] , and Twitter. Upon infection, Koobface attempts to collect login information and join the infected computer in order to be part of a botnet [10] , a so-called "zombie army" of computers, which in many cases is then used for criminal activities, such as sending spam messages and attacking other computers and servers in the Internet.
Phishing Attacks. Phishing attacks are a form of social engineering to acquire user-sensitive and private information by impersonating a trustworthy third party. A recent study [6] showed that users interacting on a social networking website are more likely to fall for phishing scams due to their innate social and trusting natures. Moreover, in recent years, phishing attempts within OSNs have increased sharply. According to the Microsoft security intelligence report [19] , 84.5% of all phishing attacks target social networks sites. One such phishing attack occurred at Facebook. In 2009, a phishing scam lured users onto fake Facebook login pages. Then, the phishing attack spread among Facebook users by inviting the users' friends to click on a link posted on the original user's wall [79] . Fortunately, Facebook acted to stop this attack.
Spammers. Spammers are users who use electronic messaging systems in order to send unwanted messages, like advertisements, to other users. Online social network spammers use the OSN platform in order to send advertisement messages to other users by creating fake profiles [42] . The spammers can also use the OSN platform to add comment messages to pages which are viewed by many users in the network. An example of the prevalence of network spamming can be found in Twitter, which has suffered from a massive amount of spam. In August 2009, 11% of Twitter messages were spam messages. However, by the beginning of 2010, Twitter had successfully cut down the percentage of spam message to 1% [23] .
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). A cross-site scripting (XSS) attack is an assault against web applications. The attacker who uses the cross site-scripting exploits the trust of the web client in the web application and causes the web client to run malicious code capable of collecting sensitive information. Online social networks, which are types of web applications, can suffer from XSS attacks. Furthermore, attackers can use an XSS vulnerability combined with the OSN infrastructure to create an XSS worm that can spread virally among social network users [69] . In April 2009, such an XSS worm, called Mikeyy, rapidly transmitted automated tweets across Twitter and infected many users, among them celebrities like Oprah Winfrey and Ashton Kutcher. The Mikeyy worm used an XSS weakness and the Twitter network structure to spread through Twitter user profiles [88] .
Internet Fraud. Internet fraud, also known as cyber fraud, refers to using Internet access to scam or take advantage of people. In the past, con artists used traditional in-person social networks, such as weekly group meetings, to gradually establish strong bonds with their potential victims. More recently, according to the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) [84] , with the rising popularity of online social networks, con artists have turned to OSNs in order to establish trust connections with their victims, and they now operate using personal data published in the victims' online profiles. In recent years, for example, fraudsters have been hacking into the accounts of Facebook users who travel abroad. Once they manage to log into a user's account, the scammers cunningly ask the user's friends for assistance in transferring money to the scammer's bank account. One victim of this type of fraud was Abigail Pickett. While travelling in Colombia, Abigail discovered that her Facebook account had been hijacked from someone in Nigeria and was being used to send requests for money to friends on the pretext that she was "stranded" [53] .
Modern Threats
Modern threats are additional current online threats that are typically unique to online social network environments. These threats use the OSN infrastructure to collect and expose personal information about a user and their friends and have even successfully lured users into clicking on specific malicious links. This category of threats can include socialbots [15, 16, 29] , inference attacks [80] , de-anonymization attacks [120] , link reconstruction attacks [43] , clickjacking [71] , sybil attacks [28] , socware [94] , and identity clone attacks [63] , just to mention a few. Usually these threats specifically target users' personal information as well as the personal information of their friends.
Today's attackers can also combine these two types of attacks -classic and modern -in order to create a more sophisticated attack. For example, an attacker can use a Trojan in order to collect a user's Facebook password and then post a message, which contains clickjacking attack, on the user's timeline in order to lure the user's trusting Facebook friends to click on the posted message and install a hidden virus onto their own computers. Another example is using cloned profiles to collect personal information about the cloned user's friends. Using the friends' personal information, the attacker can send uniquely crafted spam email containing a virus. Due to the usage of personal information, the virus is more likely to be activated. The recovery processes for these two types of threats are very distinct from each other. In order to recover from a classic attack, like a virus, in most cases it is possible to simply reinstall the operating system, change the current passwords, and cancel the affected credit cards. However, in order to recover from a modern OSN attack that "steals your reality" [5] , more effort must be invested due to the fact that resetting personal information is excessively time consuming and not always 100% possible. For example, you can change your email address, but it takes a significantly greater amount of effort to change your home address.
In the rest of this section, we illustrate the various modern threats and real-life scenarios where these types of threats have jeopardized an OSN user's privacy and security.
Clickjacking. Clickjacking is a malicious technique which tricks users into clicking on something different from what they intended to click. By using clickjacking, the attacker can manipulate the user into posting spam messages on his or her Facebook timeline, performing "likes" to links unknowingly (also referred as likejacking), and even opening a microphone and web camera to record the user [71] . An example of a clickjacking attack occurred at Twitter in 2009 when Twitter was plagued by a "Don't click" attack. The attacker tweeted a link with the message "Don't click" along with a masked URL, in which the actual URL domain is hidden. When Twitter users clicked on the "Don't click" message, the message automatically spread virally and was posted onto their Twitter accounts [76] .
De-Anonymization Attacks. In many online social networks like Twitter and MySpace, users can protect their privacy and anonymity by using pseudonyms. De-anonymization attacks use techniques such as network topology and user group memberships to uncover the user's real identity. An example of de-anonymization was presented by Wondracek et al. [120] ; they offered a method to de-anonymize users in OSNs by using only the users' group memberships. Wondracek et al. tested their method on the Xing [122] OSN and succeeded in uniquely identifying 42% of the users. An additional recent example was presented by Peled et al. [90] , who introduced a method for matching users profiles across several OSNs. The method was evaluated by matching users' profiles across the Facebook and Xing online social networks.
Fake Profiles. Fake profiles (also referred to as sybils or socialbots) are automatic or semi-automatic profiles that mimic human behaviors in online social networks. In many cases, fake profiles can be used to harvest personal user data from OSNs. By initiating friend requests to other users in the OSN, who in many cases accept the requests, the socialbots can gather a user's private data which should be exposed only to the user's friends. Additionally, fake profiles can be used to initiate sybil attacks [28] , publish spam messages [47] , or even manipulate OSN statistics [105, 103] . A recent article asserted that the market of buying fake followers and fake retweets is already a multimillion-dollar business [91] . Additional risks which lurk in fake profiles were demonstrated recently by Boshmaf et al. [15] . An army of more than a hundred Facebook socialbots was created, which attempted to infiltrate innocent Facebook profiles by initiating a series of friend requests to Facebook users. The socialbot army succeeded in generating approximately 250GB of inbound traffic from Facebook. Moreover, the socialbot friend acceptance rates climbed to 80% whenever a socialbot and an innocent Facebook user had more than eleven friends in common. In some cases, even one well-manipulated fake profile can cause sustainable damage as proven by Thomas Ryan [98] , who assumed the fictional profile of Robin Sage to connect to hundreds of users from various social networking sites.
Identity Clone Attacks. Using this technique, attackers duplicate a user's online presence in the same network, or across different networks, in order to deceive the cloned user's friends into forming a trusting relationship with the cloned profile. The attacker can use this trust to collect personal information about the user's friends or to perform various types of online fraud. An example of this type of attack occurred recently with NATO's most senior commander, Admiral James Stavridis. His profile details were cloned and used to collect data on defense ministry officials and other government officials by tricking them into becoming friends with the newly cloned Facebook profile [63] .
Inference Attacks. Inference attacks in online social networks are used to predict a user's personal, sensitive information that the user has not chosen to disclose, such as religious affiliation and sexual orientation. These type of attacks can be implemented using data mining techniques combined with publicly available OSN data, such as network topology and users' friends' data. This type of an attack was demonstrated by Mislove et al. [80] who presented techniques for predicting a user's attributes based on other users' attributes in the OSN. They tested their techniques and inferred different Facebook users' attributes, such as educational information, personal tastes and preferences, and geographic information. Recently, another example of inference attacks on organizations was introduced by Fire et al. [44] . They presented an algorithm for inferring the OSN of a targeted organization based on publicly available data from the social network. Fire et al. tested their algorithm on six organizations of different scales based on publicly available data from the organizations' employee Facebook profiles, resulting in a successful reconstruction of the social networks of these six organizations. Additionally, they were able to infer certain details, some of them confidential, about the targeted organizations.
Socware. Socware entails fake and possibly damaging posts and messages from friends in online social networks. Socware may lure victims by offering false rewards to users who install the socware-related malicious Facebook applications or visit the questionable socware website. After the users have cruised the socware website or installed the relevant application, they unknowingly end up sending socware messages or posts to their friends, essentially assisting the socware' viral spread [94] . In 2012, Rahman et al. [94] investigated over 40 million posts and discovered that 49% of the studied users were exposed to at least one socware post in a four-month period. Moreover, Rahman et al. [95] discovered that 13% of the 111,000 studied applications were malicious applications that could assist in spreading socware. Additionally, a recent study by Huang et al. [55] studied the ecosystem which enables socware to propagate (cascade). By analyzing data from the walls of approximately 3 million Facebook users over a period of five months, they discovered that "socware cascades are supported by Facebook applications that are strategically collaborating with each other in large groups."
Threats Targeting Children
Related to online social network threats is the issue of trust. Recent studies illustrate that OSN users tend to trust their friends in the network. In many cases, this trust can lead to further means of communication, possibly escalating to face-to-face encounters [119] . An additional major threat to children and teenagers is cyberbullying in which OSN users suffer from abuse initiated from people they know, such as classmates, or from strangers.
The different threats that typically target children are illustrated below, along with studies' findings on each threat. Naïve Trust. Children, in particular, are susceptible to trusting social network friends without question, yet the said friend's profile may really be a mask for sinister intentions. For example, Facebook recently estimated that around 8.7% of its users, more than 83 million profiles, are fake or duplicate accounts [35] . These duplicate accounts can be part of a socialbot army used by a third-party company to collect data on social network users. Even more disturbingly, other cases can include profiles established by child predators in order to lure their next victim.
Online Predators. The greatest concern for the personal information safety of children is reflected in the growing apprehension about Internet pedophiles, also referred to as online predators. Livingstone and Haddon [67] of EU Kids Online defined a typology in order to understand the risk and harm related to the following online activities: online harm from content (child's exposure to pornography or harmful sexual content); harm from contact (a child who is contacted by an adult or another child for the purposes of sexual abuse); and harm from conduct (the child as an active initiator of abusive or risky behaviors). Behaviors considered to be Internet sexual exploitation of children include adults using children for the production of child pornography and its distribution, consumption of child porn, and the use of the Internet as a means to initiate online or offline sexual exploitation. In their study from 2008, Wolak et al. [119] critically examined the myth and reality of the so-called online predator. The image of Internet predators in the media is of an adult man seducing and tempting innocent young boys and girls through the collection of personal data and the impersonation of being a friend to these youngsters, all the while hiding his sexual intentions until the actual meeting, which likely involves rape or kidnapping. According to Wolak et al., the truth is far more complex. Wolak et al. assert that most Internetinitiated sex crimes indeed start with establishing a relationship between an adult and a child through the use of instant messaging, emails, chats, etc. However, in most cases children are aware of the fact that they are talking to an adult, and if the relationship escalates to attending a real-life meeting, they are aware and to some extent expect to engage in sexual activity. More often than not, the encounter involves non-forcible sexual activity, yet it is with a person under the age of consent and therefore constitutes a crime. Contrary to the common notion, in most cases victims of Internet-initiated sex crimes were teenagers (aged 13-17) and none under age 12 were reported. Therefore, these crimes do not constitute the clinical definition of pedophilia: "the fantasy or act of sexual activity with prepubescent children." Risky Behaviors. In accordance with the European study mentioned above, Wolak et al. [119] maintain that risky online behaviors and specific populations who are more exposed to them can be identified. Potential risky behaviors may include direct online communication with strangers, use of chat rooms for interactions with strangers, sexually explicit talk with strangers, giving private information and photos to strangers, etc. It should be noted that while each of the above-mentioned behaviors alone poses a risk, the combination of a few of these behaviors can justifiably cause enormous anxiety regarding a child's safety. An additional finding of the Wolak et al. study is that there is a well-established link between online and offline behaviors. Researchers contend that victims of Internet abuse are very often vulnerable children, such as youths with a history of physical or sexual abuse or those who suffer from depression or social interaction problems. All children living with these kinds of issues are at a higher risk of sexual abuse on the Internet or through online initiated encounters.
Cyberbullying. Cyberbullying (also referred to as cyber abuse) is bullying that takes place within technological communication platforms, such as emails, chats, mobile phones conversations, and online social networks, by an attacker who uses the platform in to harass his victim by sending repeated hurtful messages, sexual remarks, or threats; by publishing embarrassing pictures or videos of the victim; or by engaging in other inappropriate behavior. Today, cyberbullying has become quite common in online social networks in which the attacker can utilize the OSN's infrastructure to spread cruel rumors about the victim and share embarrassing pictures with the victim's network of friends [82] . Cyberbullying usually affects children and teenagers. A recent online survey, which included 18,687 parents from 24 countries, discovered that 12% of parents claim their child has been cyberbullied [70] . Additionally, according to the survey's results, a majority of the children experienced this harassing behavior on widely used social networking sites like Facebook. Horrifically, in some cases cyberbullying can generate catastrophic results, as in the cases of Amanda Michelle Todd [82] and Rebecca Ann Sedwick [89] , both of whom committed suicide after being cyberbullied on Facebook.
Solutions
In recent years, social network operators, security companies, and academic researchers have tried to deal with the above-mentioned threats through proposing a variety of solutions (see Figure 3 and Table 1 ). In this section we describe in detail possible solutions which can assist in protecting the security and privacy of online social network users. §3 
Social Network Operator Solutions
Online social network operators attempt to protect their users by activating safety measures, such as employing user authentication mechanisms and applying user privacy settings. Several of these techniques are described in detail below.
Authentication Mechanisms. In order to make sure the user registering or logging into the online social network is a real person and not a socialbot or a compromised user account, OSN operators are using authentication mechanisms, such as CAPTCHA [15] , photos-of-friends identification [57] , multi-factor authentication [100] , and in some cases even requesting that the user send a copy of his or her government issued ID [24] . As an example, Twitter recently introduced its two-factor authentication mechanism [86] , requiring the user to not only insert a password when logging into Twitter but also provide a verification code that was sent to the user's mobile device. This mechanism prevents a malicious user from logging in through hijacked accounts and publishing false information through those hijacked accounts. Such a mechanism would thwart incidents such as when hackers hijacked the Associated Press (AP) Twitter account, resulting in the rapid propagation of false information about explosions in the White House, which caused panic on Wall Street [81] .
Security and Privacy Settings. Many online social networks support a configurable user privacy setting that enables users to protect their personal data from others in the network [75, 66] . For example, Facebook users can choose which other Facebook users are able to view their details, pictures, posts, and other personal information that appear in their Facebook profile [32] . However, many Facebook users simply maintain the default privacy settings, letting their data be exposed to strangers [41] . Some online social networks also support extra security configurations which enable the user to activate secure browsing, receive login notifications, and establish other safety features [93] .
Internal Protection Mechanisms. Several online social networks protect their users by implementing additional internal protection mechanisms for defense against spammers, fake profiles, scams, and other threats [23, 101] . Facebook, for example, protects its users from malicious attacks and information collecting by activating the Facebook Immune System (FIS). The FIS is described as an adversarial learning system that performs realtime checks and classifications on read and write actions on Facebook's database [101] .
Report Users. Online social network operators can attempt to protect children and teenage users from harassment by adding an option to report abuse or policy violations by other users in the network [34] . In some countries, social networks like Facebook and Bebo [11] have also added a "Panic Button" to better protect children and teenagers [9] .
Commercial Solutions
In recent years, various commercial companies have expanded their traditional Internet security options, and now offer software solutions specifically for OSN users to better protect themselves against threats. In this section, we present mainstream software and application-protection solutions, which were developed by well-known security companies such as Symantec and Check Point, as well as solutions which were created by several startup companies such as United Parents.
Internet Security Solutions. Many security companies, such as AVG, Avira, Kaspersky, Panda, McAfee, and Symantec [33] , offer OSN users Internet security solutions. These software suites typically include anti-virus, firewall, and other Internet protection layers which assist OSN users in shielding their computers against threats such as malware, clickjacking, and phishing attacks. For example, McAfee Internet Security software [73] provides its users with protection against various threats, such as malware, botnet, and inappropriate sites.
Norton Safe Web. Symantec's Norton Safe Web [104] is a Facebook application with more than 500,000 users. It scans the Facebook user's News Feed and warns the user about unsafe links and sites.
Trend Micro Privacy Scanner. Trend Micro Privacy Scanner for Facebook [77] is an Android application which scans the user's privacy settings and identifies risky settings which may lead to privacy concerns. It then assists the user in fixing the settings.
Websense Defensio. Websense's Defensio web service [21] helps in protecting social network users from threats like links to malware that can be posted on the user's Facebook page. The Defensio service also assists in controlling the user's published content, such as removing certain words from posts or filtering specific comments.
ZoneAlarm Privacy Scan. Check Point's ZoneAlarm Privacy Scan [22] is a Facebook application which scans recent activity in the user's Facebook account to identify privacy concerns and to control what others can see. For instance, ZoneAlarm Privacy Scan can identify posts that expose the user's private information.
ContentWatch Net Nanny. ContentWatch's Net Nanny [25] is software which assists parents in protecting their children from harmful content. Net Nanny lets parents monitor their children's social media activity on different online social network websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr [45] .
Infoglide MinorMonitor. Infoglide's MinorMonitor [56] is a parental control web service which gives parents a quick, dashboard view of their child's Facebook activities and online friends. By using MinorMonitor, parents can be alerted about questionable content that may have been revealed to their child, or they can identify over-age friends in their child's Facebook friends list.
United Parents Child Protection Service. The United Parents Child Protection Service [87] assists parents in protecting their children by monitoring and tracking a child's activity in online social networks and identifying suspicious patterns in their child's online profile. The child's privacy is maintained, but this service can help identify and report to the child's parents, via email or text message, when the child is approached by online strangers or cyberbullied.
Academic Solutions
Several recently published studies have proposed solutions to various online social networks threats. These solutions have primarily focused on identifying malicious users and applications. In this section, we present studies which provide solutions for detecting phishing attacks, spammers, cloned profiles, socware, and fake profiles. 1 Phishing Detection. Many researchers have suggested anti-phishing methods to identify and prevent phishing attacks; most of these methods have been based on techniques which attempt to identify phishing websites and phishing URLs [48, 72, 121] . In recent years with the increasing number of phishing attacks on online social networks [19] , several researchers have suggested dedicated solutions for identifying OSN phishing attacks. In 2012, Lee et al. [62] introduced the WarningBird, a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter, which can handle phishing attacks that conceal themselves by using conditional redirection URLs. Later in the same year, Aggarwal et al. [4] presented the PhishAri technique, which can detect if a tweet posted with a URL is phishing or not by utilizing specific Twitter features, such as the account age and the number of followers of the user who posted the suspicious tweet.
Spammer Detection. Many researchers have recently proposed solutions for spammer detection in online social networks [12, 27, 113, 102, 61, 3, 13] . In 2009, Benevenuto et al. [12] offered algorithms for detecting video spammers, which succeeded in identifying spammers among YouTube [125] users. In 2010, De-Barr and Wechsler [27] used the graph centrality measure to predict whether a user is likely to send spam messages. Wang [113] proposed a method to classify spammers on Twitter by using content and social network graph properties. Stringhini et al. [102] created more than 300 fake profiles (also referred as "honey-profiles") on three online social networks sites, Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, and successfully identified spammers who sent spam messages to the fake profiles. Lee et al. [61] also presented a method for detecting social spammers of different types by using honeypots combined with machine learning algorithms. In 2013, Aggarwal et al. [3] presented machine learning algorithms for detecting various type of spammers in Foursquare [46] . Recently, Bhat and Abulaish [13] introduced a community-based framework to identify OSN spammers.
Cloned Profile Detection. In 2011, Kontaxis et al. [59] proposed a methodology for detecting social network profile cloning. They designed and implemented a prototype which can be employed by users to investigate whether users have fallen victim to clone attacks. In 2013, Shan et al. [99] presented the CloneSpotter which can be deployed into the OSN infrastructure and detect cloning attacks by using various users' data records, such as a user's login IP records, which are available to the OSN operator.
Socware Detection. In the last few years a number of studies have tried to better understand and identify socware. In 2012, Rahman et al. [94] presented the MyPageKeeper Facebook application which aims to protect Facebook users from damaging posts on the user's timeline. Rahman et al. also presented the Facebook's Rigorous Application Evaluator (FRAppE) for detecting malicious applications on Facebook [95] . In 2013, Huang et al. [55] studied the socware ecosystem and discovered several insights about socware propagation characteristics that can assist in future research on the detection and prevention of socware propagation.
Fake Profile Detection. In recent years, researchers have presented algorithms, techniques, and tools to identify fake profiles and also to prevent various sybil attacks in online social networks [127, 126, 26, 106, 18, 115, 42, 40, 41, 114] . 2 In 2006, Yu et al. [127] presented the SybilGuard decentralized protocol that assists in preventing sybil attacks. Later, in 2008, Yu el al. [126] also presented the SybilLimit protocol, a near-optimal defense against sybil attacks using social networks. In 2009, Danezis and Mittal [26] offered the SybilInfer defense algorithm which can distinguish between "honest" and "dishonest" users. In the same year, Tran et al. [106] presented the SumUp sybil defense system which aims to limit the number of fake votes cast by sybils.
In 2012, Cao et al. [18] introduced the SybilRank tool which utilizes OSN graph properties to rank users according to their perceived likelihood of being fake. Later, they deployed SybilRank in the operation center of Tuenti [108] , the largest OSN in Spain, and estimated that about 90% of the 200,000 users which received the lowest ranked were actually fake profiles. In the same year, Wang et al. [115] proposed a crowdsourced fake profiles detection system and evaluated it using data from Facebook and from Renren [96] , a Chinese online social network. Also in 2012, Fire et al. [42] presented an algorithm for identifying malicious profiles using the social network's own topological features. They evaluated their methods on three directed online social networks -Academia.edu [1] , Anybeat [8] , and Google+ -and succeeded in identifying fake profiles and spammers. Fire et al. [40] also presented the Social Privacy Protector application which assists Facebook users in identifying fake profiles among their friends. They used the dataset created by the Social Privacy Protection application and developed machine learning classifiers which can identify fake profiles in Facebook [41] . Recently, Wang et al. [114] presented a system which can detect fake profiles based on analyzing clickstream models. Additional sybil defense solutions have also been studied [20, 54] . 
Recommendations
As we have demonstrated throughout this study, online social network users are facing prevalent and varied security and privacy threats. Fortunately, many software solutions and techniques exist today which can assist OSN users in better defending themselves against these threats. In this section, we provide several easy-to-apply methods which can help OSN users improve their security and privacy in online social networks such as Facebook and
Twitter. We advise OSN users who want to better protect themselves in these platforms to implement the following six recommendations in each of their OSN accounts:
1. Remove Unnecessary Personal Information. We advise OSN users to review the details they have inserted into their online social network accounts and remove extraneous information about themselves, their family, and their friends. It is also recommended that users hide their friends list if possible to prevent inference attacks.
2. Adjust Privacy and Security Settings. In many online social networks, like Facebook, the default privacy settings are insufficient. Moreover, a recent study showed that many Facebook users tend to stay with their default privacy settings [41] . In order for users to better protect themselves on Facebook and in other online social networks, we recommend modifying the privacy settings so that users' personal data will be exposed only to themselves, or at most to their friends only (for example, see Figure 4) . Additionally, if possible, we advise users to activate the secure browsing option and any other available additional authentication mechanisms (see Section 4), such as Twitter's two-factor authentication [86] .
3. Do Not Accept Friend Requests from Strangers. As we demonstrated in Section 3, fake profiles are quite common and often dangerous. Therefore, if a user receives a friend request from an unknown person, we recommend ignoring such a request. If the user is uncertain and is considering approving the friend request, we recommend performing a short background check on the new "friend" and, at a minimum, insert the friend's profile image to Google Images Search [51] and submit the friend's full name and other details to other search engines in order to validate the authenticity of the individual. In order to identify and remove strangers who are already listed as friends with the user, we recommend OSN users examine their friends list, or use applications such as the Social Privacy Protector [40] , and periodically remove friends whom they are not familiar with or friends, such as exes, who should not have access to personal information. Additionally, if parents want to better monitor their children's activity, it is also strongly recommended that they and their children scan the friends lists together in order to remove unwelcomed "friends."
4. Install Internet Security Software. We advise OSN users to install at least one of the many commercial Internet security software products; Facebook offers several free security downloads [33] . We also encourage users to install other security and privacy products as described in Section 4.2. In addition, we recommend that parents monitor their children's OSN activity by using parental control software (see Section 4.2).
5.
Remove Installed Third-Party Applications. Unbeknown to many users, third-party applications are frequently collecting online personal data. A recent study showed that 30% of an examined group of Facebook users had at least forty applications installed on their accounts [41] . It is recommended that a user not install new unnecessary applications on his or her account. Moreover, users are advised to go over their list of installed applications and remove any unnecessary applications.
6. Do Not Trust Your OSN Friends. As we described in Section 3.3, OSNs users tend to naively trust their friends in the social network. This trust has a negative side, as was demonstrated in the case of Abigail Pickett [53] . Therefore, we recommend OSN users take extra precautions when communicating with their online friends. We also recommend users to think twice before offering any personal and sensitive information about themselves, even when posting photos. Online social network users should definitely avoid revealing their home address, phone number, or credit cards numbers. 
Conclusions
Online social networks have become part of our everyday life and, on average, most Internet users spend more time on social networks than in any other online activity (see Section 2). We enjoy using online social networks to interact with other people through the sharing of experiences, pictures, videos, and other types of information. Nevertheless, online social networks also have a dark side ripe with hackers, fraudsters, and online predators, all capable of using online social networks as a platform for procuring their next victim. In this paper, we have presented scenarios which threaten online social network users and can jeopardize their identities, privacy, and well-being both in the virtual world and in the real world (see Section 3 ). In addition, we have provided examples for many of the presented threats in order to demonstrate that these threats are real and can endanger every user. Moreover, we have emphasized certain threats which challenge the safety of children and teenagers inside the online social network cyberspace.
There are remedies to these threats, and we have offered a range of solutions which aim to protect the online social network user's privacy and security (see Section 4). We have outlined some recommendations that are simple to implement for OSN users to better protect themselves (see Section 5). However, as demonstrated in Table 1 , the presented solutions are not magical antidotes which provide full protection to a user's privacy and security. In order to be well protected against the various online threats, users need to employ more than one solution, and in many cases must count on the OSN provider's assistance in providing tools (see Section 4.1) both to better protect their privacy and to identify the threats.
Therefore, we recommend that online social network users not only adopt our recommendations, but also educate themselves and their loved ones about online threats which can entice users and potentially end disastrously. All social network users must very carefully consider what personal information is being revealed about themselves, about their friends, and about their workplace. Moreover, as parents, we are obligated to educate our children to be aware of potential threats and teach them not to engage with strangers either in the real world or in the cyber world. If a user's personal information falls into the wrong hands, it can cause a vast amount of damage, and in many cases there is no way to recapture what has been lost.
Future Research Directions
The field of online social network security and privacy is a new and emerging one, filled with many directions to follow. Security researchers can continually offer better solutions to online threats; they can also discover new security threats to address. We believe that in order to improve the present solutions, the next step is to create synergy among the different security solutions which were presented in Section 4.3. This will create more robust and effective security solutions for detecting fake profiles, spammers, phishing attacks, socware, and other threats. Another possible direction is to utilize various Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques and temporal analysis algorithms, combining them with existing solutions to provide better and more accurate protection against online social networks threats. For example, researchers can predict many users' private traits, such as age and gender, based on their Facebook likes [60] . Combining this algorithm with other topological-based fake profile detection methods (see Section 4.3) can assist in spotting fake details, such as a false age, thus identifying fake profiles. An additional possible future research direction includes studying the emerging security threats due to the increasing popularity of geo-location tagging of social network users [97] and offering solutions for threats unique to geosocial networking. Overall, researches can play a significant role by recognizing the value of solution synergies, by applying useful techniques and algorithms, and by understanding unique threat situations within online social networks.
